



Model-bounded monitoring of hybrid systems

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Safety Critical CPSs

Self-driving car crash in Arizona: Red light runner hits Waymo van



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Tesla Model 3: Autopilot engaged during fatal crash

17 May 2019

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
A photograph of a red Tesla Model 3 convertible car after a crash. The car is parked on a paved surface, and its top is down. The car appears to be in a lot or a parking area with other vehicles in the background. A black box with the text 'The Tesla Model 3 after the crash' is at the bottom of the image. A small 'NTSB' logo is in the bottom right corner of the image.

<https://www.abc15.com/news/region-southeast-valley/chandler/waymo-car-involved-in-chandler-arizona-crash>

<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-48308852>



Monitoring

Specification: No ($v > 120$)





Monitoring

Specification: No $(v > 120)$





Monitoring with Sampling

Specification: No ($v > 120$)





Monitoring with Sampling

Specification: No ($v > 120$)




Monitoring with Sampling

Specification: No ($v > 120$)




Signal Interpolation

Specification: No ($v > 120$)





Signal Interpolation

Specification: No ($v > 120$)




Signal Interpolation

Specification: No ($v > 120$)





Signal Interpolation

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Signal Interpolation

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
Interpolation with Prior Knowledge

Specification: No ($v > 120$)



Impossible because

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$




Model-Bounded Monitoring

Our Contribution

Specification: No ($v > 120$)

Knowledge
(bounding model)

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$



Model-Bounded Monitoring

Our Contribution

Specification: No ($v > 120$)


Knowledge
(bounding model)

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$



Feasible execution with

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$



Model-Bounded Monitoring

Our Contribution

Specification: No ($v > 120$)

Knowledge
(bounding model)

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$



Model-Bounded Monitoring

Our Contribution

Specification: No ($v > 120$)



Knowledge
(bounding model)

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$



Feasible execution with

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$




Q. How to Represent Bounding Model?

Knowledge
(bounding model)

$$\left| \frac{dy}{dt} \right| < K$$

A. Linear Hybrid Automata



Contributions

- Proposed model-bounded monitoring
 - Bounding model (knowledge): linear HAs \mathcal{M}
- Formalized with monitored language $L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M})$
 - $L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M})$: possible *discrete* observations of \mathcal{M}
- Algorithms + implementations
 - Idea: bounded-time reachability
 - Experiment → effectively monitorable

Model-Bounded Monitoring

Our Contribution

Given



- Bounding model in LHA \mathcal{M}
- Safety Specification φ
- Discrete Log w

$$\left| \frac{dv}{dt} \right| < K$$

No ($v > 120$)



Decide if the actual behavior might violate the spec.



Model-Bounded Monitoring

Our Contribution

Given



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No ($v > 120$)



Decide if the actual behavior might violate the spec.



Monitored Language L_{mon}

Our Contribution

Combine cont. exec. of \mathcal{M} and disc. obs. of w

$$L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M}) = \{ \text{Discr. Obs } w \mid$$




Monitored Language L_{mon}

Our Contribution

Combine cont. exec. of \mathcal{M} and disc. obs. of w

$$L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M}) = \{ \text{Discr. Obs } w \mid \exists \text{ exec. } \sigma \text{ of } \mathcal{M} \text{ s.t.} \}$$




Monitored Language L_{mon}

Our Contribution

Combine cont. exec. of \mathcal{M} and disc. obs. of w

$$L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M}) = \{ \text{Discr. Obs } w \mid \exists \text{ exec. } \sigma \text{ of } \mathcal{M} \text{ s.t. } w \text{ is a sample of } \sigma \}$$



Workflow of Model-bounded Monitoring


1. Construct an LHA $\mathcal{M}_{\neg\varphi}$ from bounding model \mathcal{M} and spec. φ

Idea: Product of LHAs


2. Check if $w \in L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M}_{\neg\varphi})$

Idea: Bounded-time reachability analysis


Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability




Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability




Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability




Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability




Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability




Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability



Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability



Algorithm: Bounded-time Reachability



Implementations



Approach 1: Utilize existing model-checker (PHAVerLite)

Pros: Highly-optimized reachability analysis impl.

Approach 2: Implement dedicated monitor (HAMoni)





Pros: Best performance in theory


Environment of Experiments

- Used 3 benchmarks on adaptive cruise controller (**ACC**) + 1 robot navigation (**NAV**) benchmark
- **ACC**: Cars should not be too close (or no physical contact)

- **NAV**: Do not enter an unsafe region

- Amazon EC2 c4.large instance / Ubuntu 18.04 LTS (64 bit)
 - 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3, 2 vCPUs, 3.75 GiB RAM

Experiment Results

Changing Observation Length

PHAVerLite, dim. 3, $\varepsilon = 2.0$ 
PHAVerLite, dim. 3, $\varepsilon = 0.9$ 
HAMoni, dim. 3, $\varepsilon = 2.0$ 
HAMoni, dim. 3, $\varepsilon = 0.9$ 




Dedicated impl.
 $\approx 10x$ faster

> 5000
samples / sec.

Experiment Results


Changing Model Dimension



Future work:
further optimization

Experiment Results

False Alarms



False alarm for “very safe” exec.
→ sampling is coarse

Conclusions

- Proposed model-bounded monitoring
 - Bounding model (knowledge): linear HAs \mathcal{M}
- Formalized with monitored language $L_{\text{mon}}(\mathcal{M})$
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